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Abstract 
 
I describe three legal cases in which I acted as a memory expert witness. The 
cases contain remarkable accounts of memories. Such memories are by no 
means unusual in legal cases, often are over retention intervals measured in 
decades, and contain details the specificity of which is highly unusual. For 
example, recalling from childhood verbatim conversations, clothes worn by self 
and others, the weather, actions that at the time could not have been understood, 
details that could not have been known, precise durations and calendar dates, 
and much more. I show how our scientific understanding of memory can help 
courts reach more informed decisions about such fantastical ‘memories’ and 
how these memories constitute data that as researchers we should seek to 
understand.  
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Being a memory expert witness is a lonely business, but it has some rewards. 
The main one in my view is that one has the opportunity to apply what one has learnt 
about human memory, in the real world and in so doing make a contribution to 
society generally. After all as researchers we have been funded by our society and as 
dutiful researchers we have, of course, developed the understanding of our areas, 
discovered new facts, made new insights and each of us has contributed to moving the 
field along, at least a little. When, then, an opportunity arises to apply what we have 
discovered and learnt and assist public bodies, such as courts, with expert advice they 
would not otherwise have, I personally think it is our duty to do so.  
Rather an idealistic stance? Well it certainly is but nonetheless I believe it and I 
also believe(d!) that the courts, for instance, would welcome such advice. The reality 
is, however, rather different. Courts do not want expert advice, not just on memory 
but on anything. They want decisions to be made by juries, as far as possible on the 
evidence presented to them by the complaint(s) and (non-expert) witnesses. Judges 
are endlessly vigilant that an expert’s evidence does not undermine or supplant the 
decision making of the jury. In the case of memory for example, the current view is 
that the jurors all have memories of their own and therefore are perfectly able to judge 
evidence in the form of memories when that is presented to them; rather an idealistic 
view too. Do the general public understand the nature of knowledge represented in 
memory, processes of retrieval, memory construction, impairments of memory 
following brain damage and psychological illnesses, the development of memory over 
the lifespan from childhood to old age? Of course not, why should they? They do not 
study human memory. So how then do they judge accounts of memories, especially 
when memory is the only evidence available, as is frequently the case? They do so, as 
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we all do in areas where we have no expert knowledge or advice, we judge on the 
basis of we what believe, for whatever reason, to be true.  
I, for instance, know virtually nothing about ‘genetic fingerprinting’ and have 
long believed that it must be utterly definitive evidence when presented in a court. If 
the accused’s genetic fingerprint was found on some incriminating item, say the 
murder weapon, some item of clothing, or whatever, then surely they must be guilty? 
What more is there to consider? Case solved. A recent article changed my views. It 
turns out that what is at least as important as the genetic material itself is how it got to 
where it was found, and that is often not straightforward at all. In the case of memory 
such complexity is commonplace. The belief that when a person reports a memory 
they are doing so because they had an experience, formed a memory or set of 
memories, and now can report details of the past experience, is an oversimplification 
that in my view has led to many miscarriages of justice and unsound convictions.  
The modern view of human memory, now based on very extensive scientific 
research from the behavioural to the neuroscientific, shows that human memories are 
mental constructions, that contain inferences, occasionally erroneous details, are 
always time-compressed relative to the original experience and therefore are always 
incomplete. Moreover, wholly false memories are more common than previously 
thought, especially for childhood events and, even more alarmingly, it turns out to be 
almost trivially easy to create false memories in others  (see ‘Memory & The Law’, a 
Report from the Research Board of the British Psychological Society, 2008, and/or 
the collection of readings in Nadel & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012). In addition the 
complicated neural networks that mediate remembering are not developed in their full 
form until early adulthood (mid-20s) and begin to deteriorate in later life (70+), (The 
Royal Society. (2012). Brain Waves 4. Neuroscience and the law). Would a typical 
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juror be aware of the modern view of human memory and its implications for memory 
evidence? I suggest not. 
Consider the following memory - but before you do please note that what is 
described both here and later is based on anonymised real cases and it features some 
memories with sexually explicit content  – this is one of several memories from a 35 
year-old adult complainant reporting alleged sexual abuse dating back to when she 
was 6 to 8 years of age. This is her memory of the first instance of abuse, as described 
in her police video interview: 
He had a sort of den upstairs above the garage at the end of the garden. We 
used to play there and he was sometimes there too as he had a workshop at 
the back of garage. This first time Gran had gone to the shops and I was 
there on my own and he said to me “Look Sal I’m going down to the 
workshop to fix something” … I can’t remember what, although I think it 
might have been the toaster which was always burning the toast … “you 
come with me and you play in the den while I’m working”. I jumped up 
and we went out and it was a lovely sunny day, in July I think, the school 
holidays had just started. They had a lovely long garden and I skipped 
ahead of him down the garden path. When we got in the garage he said 
he’d give me a hand up the stepladder into the den. I was wearing a 
summer dress. I went first and he came behind me. And as I got to the top 
of the steps he was a couple of rungs down and right behind me he put his 
arm on my waist to steady me and then he put his other hand up my dress 
and touched my knickers. I didn’t really pay it any attention but just 
climbed up into the den, really I should have known what it meant, but I 
didn’t … I was just too young. He climbed in behind me and we both fell 
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over almost on top of each other. We were laughing, it didn’t hurt because 
he had these big sort of scatter cushions everywhere and we landed on 
them. I was lying on my back and he was leaning on one hand, his right 
hand, and he pulled my dress up with his other hand. I didn’t feel 
frightened just curious I suppose. He slowly ran his fingers up between my 
legs pushing them apart, gently until he reached the point where my 
knickers covered my vagina and then, also gently he stroked the area and 
then pulled them to one side and stroked my clitoris. 
This account of a  ‘memory’ has many features that a memory researcher would 
find surprising from the temporal details (it was July) to exactly which hand was used 
(children aged six frequently have yet to develop accurate concepts of handedness, 
McManus, 2002, so how could it be encoded?). The narrative flow of the account 
suggests that it has been extensively rehearsed even, perhaps, rehearsed with others. 
Produced, maybe, as ‘homework’ during a course of therapy. But is it true? As 
memory researchers we know that we cannot determine whether such an account is 
true or not. What we can do, however, is point to unusual features of the account 
itself, the unusually specific details for example, and also, if known, potential 
negative influences operating when the account was created. If it had emerged during 
therapy featuring ‘memory work’ then the possibility of a false memory is raised 
(Loftus, 1997). More generally a memory researcher might point out that the memory 
falls in the period of childhood amnesia, roughly below the age of about 7 to 8 years, 
a period from which few memories can be recalled (Bruce, et al., 2000, 2005; 
Pillemer, 1998; Pillemer & White, 1989; Rubin, 2000; Waldfogel, 1948; Wang & 
Conway, 2004; Wells, Morrison, Conway, 2013; Wetzler & Sweeney, 1986). 
Moreover, it is recalled over a lengthy retention interval of 29 years. Both factors 
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detrimental to detailed recall of a childhood autobiographical memory. Let’s now turn 
to three legal cases in which memory was the evidence and in which I was called as a 
memory expert witness. The first of these is a case of adult recall of alleged sexual 
abuse, the second a case of unconscious plagiarism, and the third features some 
remarkable memories of work. 
 
A Case of Historic1 Child Sex Abuse 
A father was accused by his daughter of repeated sexual abuse from the age of 3 
to 13 years, when the abuse abruptly and inexplicably stopped. The daughter, I will 
refer to her as ‘B’, at the age of 20 made a witness statement (WS) to a female 
policewoman (a child protection officer ‘trained’ in taking such accounts). B’s WS 
contained a series of memories of escalating acts of sexual abuse culminating in a 
detailed and vivid memory of a rape by multiple assailants in her father’s hardware 
store. B’s memories in her WS are considered as specimen memories from a history 
of what is alleged to be almost continuous abuse up to the age of 13.  
At the trial the father, a long-serving manager of his own hardware store, 
presented as a shabbily dressed rather inarticulate, cold, distant and disengaged 
individual. In the many cases of historic sexual abuse I have acted in it is quite often 
the case that these late middle-aged, nearly always male, defendants are unable to 
engage the court or, crucially, the jury in any meaningful way. Their usual response to 
the prosecution’s, typically highly aggressive direct suggestions that they did indeed 
commit the acts they are accused of, is ‘it never happened’, ‘no I didn’t’, and so on. 
                                                          
1
 The term ‘historic’ is used in the British Courts to refer to cases in which an adult recalls memories of 
alleged offences from years or decades ago. 
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When challenged to explain why the complainant might be lying, might have made it 
all up, they are at a loss for words and can make no insightful reply.  
In contrast, B was an attractive and articulate young woman studying a science 
subject at a leading university. She wept and was visibly distressed by having to 
recount her memories of the alleged abuse in open court. We might note here that she 
had, of course, exercised her right to study her WS extensively prior to giving her 
evidence under oath in the court. Questioned first by the prosecution she was able to 
recall, in great detail, early memories of emotionally negative but not abuse memories 
from the age of 3, memories of inappropriate touching from the age of 4, memories of 
digital penetration from about 4/5 onwards including being forced to masturbate him, 
rape at the age of 5, oral and anal rape from 5/6 onwards, all featuring ejaculation by 
the father, and continuous abuse of this sort up to age of about 12 when other men 
were introduced into the abuse, and featuring a detailed and vivid memory of oral, 
anal, and vaginal rape in the back of her father’s shop by 6 to 7 men, including the 
father. In addition there was a memory of objects being inserted in her vagina. We 
will come to some of these memories later, all that needs to be noted here is that her 
memories, from all ages, were vivid and detailed and included remembering 
locations, clothes, objects, hands used, smells, tastes, emotions of her own and others, 
time of day, times of year, sometimes an exact date (being raped on her 10th birthday), 
verbatim recall of conversations, and detailed recall of sexual acts performed on her. 
The judge, clearly sympathetic, instigated the occasional short break so she could 
regain her composure. Her evidence lasted a full and gruelling day and consisted 
entirely of her memories, no other evidence was presented. 
The defence questioned B extensively but were not able to find any major 
inconsistencies or weaknesses in her account of her memories (although they did miss 
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an important one). The judge intervened on several occasions largely to find out what 
the point was of making B repeat all these distressing memories again. Of course, the 
defence were looking for inconsistencies between her memories as presented to the 
gentle questions of the prosecution who had elicited them the preceding day and as 
presented to the more forceful questioning of the defence lawyer. The reason for this 
is that barristers, solicitors, lawyers in general, have a non-expert understanding of 
human memory and, when memories are the evidence, they are often at a loss as to 
how to find a line of defence they regard as at least promising. In B’s case the defence 
made a fatal error when they decided to pursue the line that B’s memories were false. 
In support of this they called a clinical expert with some experience of ‘false memory 
syndrome’ (Yapko, 1997). Of course, there is no such syndrome but some common 
features of ‘retractors’, mainly form North America, have been noted. These are 
individuals who have made allegations of sexual and other types of abuse, often that 
have gone to trial and led to prosecutions, only to be later retracted. One feature is 
that the accounts of abuse often escalate into memories of abuse by multiple 
assailants, gangs, and even aliens, and alien abduction. Another is that of memories of 
objects being inserted into the vagina and/or anus. The expert pointed out, correctly 
so, that B’s memories had these features and that this at least raised the possibility 
they might be false. However, when directly challenged with “How do you know that 
B’s memories are false?” The expert could only say he did not. The prosecution won 
the day and B’s father received a 14-year prison sentence - the hard end of memory 
evidence. 
An appeal was launched but these take time and the Appeal Court will only 
consider an appeal on the basis of new evidence. It was difficult to see what new 
evidence there might be in this case. Nonetheless an important body, the Criminal 
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Cases Review Committee (CCRC), were uneasy with the conviction and a case was 
built that it should be re-examined. Some aspects of this were legal, the judge for 
example should have formally warned the jury to exercise due caution because the 
only evidence they had was B’s memories. In his summing up he had done this but in 
rather round about and ambiguous way. There were some other grounds for concern 
too, one of which were the memories themselves. For reasons I have never uncovered 
a member of the CCRC had somehow found out this area of research called 
‘autobiographical memory’ (this was a number of years ago before autobiographical 
memory became the research industry it now is, surprising then that this CCRC 
member knew about it). The committee approached me and asked if there was any 
research on adults remembering childhood. I told them there was, and briefly 
explained some of the findings and theory that then existed. They were particularly 
interested in the concept of ‘childhood amnesia’, hardly a new concept in memory 
research (going back to at least Henri & Henri, 1898, and Freud, 1915), but new to the 
CCRC and, moreover, new to the courts – especially the Court of Appeal. 
I was then ‘instructed’ by the CCRC to prepare a report. The report was to 
answer three very specific questions. It is worth knowing this is how the law proceeds 
and I have learnt over the years that one should answer such instructions specifically 
and in detail. The instructions often relate to a line of defence that is being considered 
but at the time of writing the expert does not know what that line of defence will be. I 
have come to that think this is good practice, the expert cannot then mislead, either 
explicitly or implicitly, by providing evidence that is biased to that line of defence. 
The instructions asked about:  
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1. adult recollection of childhood events, particularly those dating to 
below about 7 to 8 years of age, and how these related to B’s early 
memories, 
2. the potential effects of therapy/counselling on B’s memories,  
3. and whether it would be possible to completely forget a highly vivid 
memory of a traumatic experience that one could previously remember 
in detail, as B had done when questioned by the defence. 
As far as the first instruction was concerned I explained the nature of childhood 
amnesia, recall of memories below about 8 age years of age rapidly tailed off 
(Walfogel, 1948), with accelerated forgetting below the age of 5 years (Wetzler & 
Sweeney, 1986). The age of the earliest memory was around 3 years 4 months and 
few people’s earliest memories dated to below the age of 3 years (Rubin, 2000). It 
was thought not possible to recall any memories from the preverbal period (24/30 
months approximately) or below (see Hayne, 2004, and Howe, 2011, for review). 
Moreover, recent findings indicated that fully formed memories, rather than memory 
fragments, date to the age of 6/7 years (Bruce, et. al., 2000, 2005; Wells, et al., 2013). 
From our own data base of earliest memories (at that point the corpus consisted of 
about 2,000 memories, it is now over 6,500) there were no memories featuring recall 
of handedness, few that mentioned weather, clothes, thoughts, conversations, etc. 
Instead early memories tended to be of fragments of experience, quite idiosyncratic in 
content and rarely richly detailed and recalled in a fluent narrative form. In these 
respects, then, B’s memories from below the age of about 8 years were remarkably 
unusual. 
B started her WS by recalling her earliest memory. Why is unclear but possibly 
B thought that this would establish the age from which she was able to have clear and 
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detailed memories – a type of detail that Bell and Loftus (1989) proposed served the 
purpose of trivial persuasion. That is, recalling trivial or irrelevant details in order to 
convince one’s audience that one really is remembering. B’s earliest memory was: 
“I remember standing in the garden looking at the back of the house – it was the 
July just before my third birthday. The garden was full of rubbish and weeds and the 
back of the house was shabby and in disrepair with cracked paint peeling off the 
windows, he (her father) never kept anything in good shape.” 
Clearly no 2/3 year-old child could have such a memory full as it is of adult concepts 
such as ‘weeds’, ‘shabby’, ‘disrepair’, etc. Also recalling that the event was just 
before her 3rd birthday seems highly unusual too, time markers are typically not well 
recalled (Thompson, et al., 1996) and it seems unlikely that a 2/3 year-old would 
know the month of the year. 
A common defence against this line of argument is that the rememberer has a 
(visual) image in mind from this time and now describes it in adult terms. But 
remembering what one cannot understand at the time, from non-words to non-objects 
(Schacter, et al., 1990) is poor, and remembering stories where comprehension is low 
is subject to condensation, distortion, and error (Bartlett, 1932). Indeed the degree of 
understanding of complex negative events has been found to correlate with the 
amount that can later be recalled (Goodman, et al., 1994). Thus, although it is the case 
that B’s first memory is undoubtedly reported in adult concepts and words, concepts 
and words she would not have had as a 3-year-old, this simply begs the question: 
what does she actually ‘remember’ compared to what she infers, guesses, or adds in to 
make the account consistent, coherent, and narratively fluid? This point is particularly 
important when it comes to sexual acts that she could not have understood as an 
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infant/child. Finally, given the paucity of early memories and their fragmentary nature 
B’s first memory and subsequent early abuse memories stand out as being highly 
unusual. And this is the important point: a memory expert can tell a court what is 
unusual and why. Jurors and others without expert knowledge in the area cannot 
know this. 
The CCRC also sent me some papers from the case including some, so called, 
“unused” evidence. Evidence can be unused for a variety of reasons but one reason is 
that the prosecution and defence both agree that it is not relevant to line of argument 
either is taking. In B’s case the fact that she had been in “survivor” counselling for 3 
years prior to making her witness statement and lived with a woman during that 
period who had written a book on survivors of childhood sexual abuse, was 
apparently considered irrelevant to the ‘false memory’ defence with its focus on the 
escalating memories of abuse by insertion of objects into B’s vagina and rape by 
multiple men. We know now, however, after many years of research (and argument) 
that counselling/therapy even discussion with others can lead to false memories of 
sexual abuse. The base rates are not known but it is generally considered that 
interventions that feature “memory work” and or imaging what might have taken 
place, writing narratives of these and recounting them to others can all lead the 
emergence of false memories by imagination inflation (Garry, et al., 1996). Thus, 
periods spent in remembering the past with others, professionals or not, need to be 
taken into account when trying to identify the source of memories: imagination or 
experience. By the modern view of human memory both will usually be causes to 
varying degrees. 
I suggested that even it was now some years since the case that the notes of the 
counsellor should be obtained and examined, their affiliation and training established, 
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and the book written by her friend (privately distributed) be examined. The counsellor 
had no formal training and had become a ‘counsellor’ through working for a crisis 
charity. There were no notes to the sessions as none had been taken. The book 
contained several accounts of child sexual abuse similar to those in B’s memories and 
advice on how to work to remember the abuse memories, memories that would come 
to mind with effort. I suggested to the CCRC that the possibility of generating false 
memories was increased by these interventions. I pointed out that such false memories 
could arise by repeatedly imagining and by images later being recalled and 
mistakenly experienced as memories – a source monitoring error (Johnston, 
Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). There was no reason to suppose explicit intentions to 
deceive, it could happen quite ‘naturally’. 
Finally, and remarkably B in her WS had recalled, in detail, a multiple rape by 
several men in the backroom of her father’s hardware store. She had also recalled 
some episodes predating this when she claimed to recall her father and another man, 
who she did not know, subjecting her to various sexual acts including rape by both 
men. When questioned by the prosecution, remember B is the prosecution’s witness, 
she was gently reminded of parts of her WS in which she had described her memories 
of the rapes by her father the anonymous assailant. She recalled these and was able to 
provide details, especially of the conversation they had with each other while jointly 
assaulting her. However, when questioned with repeated cues from her WS about the 
assault by multiple men she denied that she had ever been raped by more then her 
father and other man. This a most unusual omission, especially as the court’s growing 
acceptance of these remarkable memories being true accounts was based on the 
repeated suggestion by the prosecution that these events were so unusual and so 
traumatic that they would inevitably be vividly recalled. This “burnt into memory” 
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belief is a common one to encounter in the courts in the UK, although as we know as 
memory researchers the relation between emotion and memory is not a simple as this 
(see Riesberg & Hertel, 2004). Perhaps even more remarkable was that the defence 
did not pick up on this omission, perhaps because of the many breaks in her testimony 
sanctioned by the judge. I noted in my report that very vivid memories of any events 
are usually remembered fairly consistently on different occasions of recall (e.g., 
Luminet & Curci, 2009). There did not appear to be any studies that reported vivid 
memories being recalled on one occasion and then forgotten shortly after. 
So, how was this expert memory testimony received by the Appeal Court 
judges? Not especially well. I was given a 3-hour grilling in the witness box at the 
Royal Court of Appeal. One thing I learnt from this is that there is much that is 
relevant in these cases that we simply have not researched. What is the evidence, for 
example, that people typically cannot remember the weather, clothes, orientation of 
limbs, etc., for memories dating to early childhood? There is some research evidence 
forthcoming (Wells, et al., 2013), but the appeal court judges want exactly what is 
known, what the evidence is, and if there is none they want to know that too. It was a 
salutatory experience to realise how much we did not know about adult 
autobiographical memory for childhood. They were fairly dismissive of my 
suggestion that the undisclosed evidence of counselling was relevant but thought the 
memory failure in the trial possibly was an issue, but not new evidence. Instead, and 
to my surprise, they concluded that ‘childhood amnesia’ was new evidence and it was 
expert evidence that a jury could not have know by virtue of their own memories. On 
that basis it was concluded that B’s ‘memories’ were questionable and the appeal was 
upheld and her father released – after 7 years in prison. 
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A Case of Memory for a Guitar Riff 
In 1971 a famous rock band, Pinky2, played a series of venues in the southern 
Sylvanian city of Freedonia. At the time Pinky featured one of the world’s leading 
rock guitarists, let’s call him Jimmy Clapton (JC for short) who some 15 years later, 
long after Pinky had split up, had a world-wide solo hit featuring one of his trade-
mark floating and haunting guitar riffs. After their performance in Freedonia, Pinky 
and their entourage visited a nearby night club night where a local band, Rufus T, 
were playing. Rufus T had a lead guitarist who had modelled himself on JC and they 
rather proudly played their first single with an original if rather derivate and standard 
guitar solo. Sadly for Rufus T their single bombed and they were never heard of 
again, until that is JC released his world-wide hit single in 1986. The lead guitarist of 
Rufus T sued for copyright infringement claiming that JC’s 1986 guitar riff was 
copied from their first and only single, which he, JC, had heard (once) live at the 
nightclub in Freedonia some 15 years earlier. And, indeed, there was a high degree of 
similarity between the two riffs when the two records were compared. 
Unsurprisingly JC claimed to have no memory for the nightclub or Rufus T and 
neither did any of the surviving members of Pinky. Indeed, none of the band members 
including JC had any memory of ever having played in Sylvania. They had been a 
hard-living rock band and substance abuse at that time in their life had been the norm. 
In 1971 they had played over a 100 sets in a raucous and wild European tour. From a 
memory perspective given the effects of drugs and alcohol on memory and the 
repeated nature of their performances which featured the same play-list over the 
whole tour, JC’s fragmentary memories attached to some generic/schematic 
knowledge of the performances is what would be expected. Assuming JC and the 
                                                          
2
 Obviously these names are fictitious. 
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other band members were truthful that they could not remember, this would seem to 
rule out any conscious or intentional attempt by JC to purposely copy the Rufus T riff. 
However, the prosecution argued that the plagiarism was unconscious, but even so, it 
was still plagiarism and infringement of copyright and a case ensued in which 
compensation of several million pounds was sought. 
Under Sylvania law, and as is the case in several European countries, a 
defendant has to prove her or his innocence. In other words the defendant is by 
default guilty until they provide the evidence that demonstrates their innocence. (It is 
interesting that although this is the reverse of U.K. law defendants in cases of 
historical sexual abuse are in very much the same situation). The case was presided 
over by an investigating judge and no jury was used. The judge fairly quickly decided 
to call the experts and a professor at a prestigious School of Music was asked if it was 
possible to hear a piece of music once and later reproduce that piece of music, fairly 
exactly and believe it to be one’s own creation rather than a copy. The music 
Professor started with an interesting example; Mozart had, allegedly on returning 
from a concert written the entire score of the music he had heard that evening, 
suggesting that one hearing for a music expert might be sufficient to produce a 
detailed and durable long-term memory representation. The Professor who was 
knowledgeable of the scientific research into memory for music (see Sloboda, 1985, 
for a comprehensive review) listed various findings that further supported the notion 
that a musician could, from a single listening, memorize at least part of a passage of 
music. For example, repetition is known to increase retention and the Rufus T riff 
contains a key phrase that is repeated four times. Musicians also have a technique for 
analysing heard music call ‘listening off’ and this too improves memory. The riff 
itself was judged likely to induce emotion and according to the Professor this too 
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would increase memory. Lastly the professor had his research assistant conduct an 
experiment using students at the school, who it was found were able to reproduce, 
fairly exactly, the riff after one hearing over a retention interval of several days. His 
conclusion was that all the memory evidence supported the proposal that JC had 
indeed heard the piece once and then unconsciously plagiarised it 15 to16 years later. 
At this point I was approached for an opinion of memory more generally and a 
second music expert was also called. As often happens in cases where experts are 
called they are pitted against one and other and this can lead to fairly entrenched 
views especially when the scientific evidence is ambiguous or lacking. In my report I 
agreed with the music Professor’s listing of the findings on memory for music, which 
were correct. However, I pointed out that all were from experiments in which the 
retention intervals had been typically of a few minutes or hours and all featured 
intentional memory (i.e., participants were instructed at the outset to remember). The 
relevance of these findings to unconscious or implicit retention was, thus, not clear. 
The Mozart vignette turned out to be apocryphal and he had written only a few lines 
of the piece that had caught his interest (Sachs, 2007). In any case no one was 
suggesting that JC or the guitarist from Rufus T were at a level of musical expertise 
comparable to that of Mozart. The second music expert produced a particularly 
interesting report in which he demonstrated that the guitar riff itself was a very 
common one. It had featured in the work of many artists and famous songs (e.g., ‘I 
will survive’ and many others). Perhaps more importantly it featured in several JC 
songs from the late 1960’s and it seems most likely that Rufus T themselves had 
copied it from JC or some other source. Finally, the music students who had been able 
to recall the piece after one hearing were most probably recalling this standard riff 
rather than the piece itself. The second music expert concluded that the only 
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difference in how this progression differed from song to song was tempo and the way 
the strings were played. I concluded that there was no scientific evidence that a person 
could be exposed to a piece of music once and then reproduced it fairly exactly after a 
15 year retention interval and be unaware of its source. 
It would seem then that the memory evidence was overwhelmingly against 
Rufus T and in favour of JC, but in fact this was not the case. The problem with the 
memory evidence in this case is that is not especially relevant to the proposal that 
unconscious retention over a 15-year period after a single exposure is possible. 
Instead it is negative and simply states that from a scientific point of view we do not 
know. Negative evidence does not prove one’s innocence, in Sylvania at least, and 
probably elsewhere too. Nonetheless, having a definitive statement from an expert 
about what is not known can be of use to a court and rule out what are often unhelpful 
speculations. 
 
A Case of Memory for Work 
An American law firm called me one day. They were representing a large 
financial corporation that owned banks and various finance houses, let’s call them 
‘PPA Inc’. The lawyer explained that was facing a ‘class action’ from a set of former 
employees. A ‘class action’ (which I had not encountered before) is when a group of 
witnesses/plaintiffs each provide individual legal statements – affidavits – that make 
the same class of allegations against the same body. Note that this occasionally occurs 
in the UK when, for example, a number of complainants all allege abuse from the 
same source (e.g. a residential school or home). In cases where a number of 
individuals all allege sexual abuse by the same person the allegations often, at first 
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glance, appear much stronger, even though they are still based on the memories of 
individuals. In this case, however, the alleged abuse was rather different. The class 
action, made in 2008, alleged that there had been a culture of bullying in PPA offices 
emanating from managers who had compelled staff to work unpaid overtime over a 
period of 25 years. This was particularly serious for PPA because if upheld the 
outcome could have been that the corporation compensate all employees, at the 
appropriate level, who had worked for them during this period. A potential pay-out of 
hundreds of millions.  My instruction was: is it possible for people to remember 
precise dates, hours of the day, and durations of time spent working? 
The only evidence in this case were the accounts of memories in the sworn 
affidavits of the complainants. There were no work records, diaries, or any other form 
of external record of the alleged hours worked.  Consider some of these memories: 
Plaintiff 1 worked for PPA for 27 years from 1980 to 2007. She stated that “in 
1994/95 we were short-staffed and my manager made me work about 15 minutes 
extra virtually every day. In total about 2hs 15ms extra per week, which was unpaid. 
He made it clear that if I failed to do this my job would be at risk.” 
Plaintiff 7 worked for PPA for 14 years, 1988 to 2002, and stated that “we 
always did the till as soon as the bank closed and it had to be completed before we 
could leave. Some days people left early for legitimate reasons but that meant those of 
us who were left had to do their tills. When I first started work there I was told I was 
on probation and could be dismissed if my work wasn’t up to standard. Several of the 
other female tellers had young children and often had to leave early and I had to finish 
their tills. This led to me working, I would guess, about 2 hours extra per week 
throughout 1988 and ’89, until I moved to another branch.” 
 21 
Plaintiff 12 (there were 12 plaintiffs in all) worked for PPA from 1987 to 2007 
and stated, “We often had to see clients late in the afternoon. The routine was that 
we’d complete yesterday’s paper work in the morning then after lunch set up new 
appointments and then interview clients between 3 and 5pm. I distinctly remember 
that in July 1989 I was basically forced by the threat of losing my job – he said he’d 
transfer me to another office to which I would not have been able to commute – to 
work ‘till 6.30pm every day. This was not uncommon and would happen variably but 
frequently, until this particular office manager moved to head office. This happened 
to others too and I believe it was basically because they didn’t have enough people in 
the office to deal with the volume of work.” 
Is it possible to remember such specific times, durations, and dates? The answer 
is not usually. It has long been known that calendar dates in autobiographical memory 
are rare (Skrowonski, et al., 1996). Precise dates are retained in memories because 
they are integral to the memory (e.g. the birth of a child, wedding day, deaths, etc.) or 
are linked to some other memorable date, (birthday, Christmas, etc.) or to memory for 
some other personal or public landmark event (e.g. England winning the World Cup, 
assassination of JFK, and so on).  But this aside in general, calendar dates are not 
retained in memory but rather inferred with reference to other information in memory, 
even then an exact date is usually no more than an informed guess. What about 
memory for duration? Is it possible to remember how long a period of work lasted? 
This is called ‘retrospective duration’ and it is determined by the amount of 
information processed during the target period, a lot leads to overestimation of 
duration and a little to underestimation – the so called ‘filled time illusion’ (Wearden, 
et al., 2007, see Zakay, 2012, for a review). In either case duration is estimated and, 
therefore, the claimed period of overtime worked can at best be estimates the 
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accuracy of which is unknown. Finally, the plaintiff’s memories are all of highly 
scripted or schematic events and it is well know that memory for specific instances of 
repeated schematic events is low and only usually occurs when something distinctive 
relative to the schema is present in the event (Brewer & Treyens, 1981). Repeatedly 
working overtime on many different days will not give rise to many specific 
memories. Thus, frequency too is an estimate or inference the accuracy of which, 
again, is unknown. In summary my report stated that duration, frequency, and 
calendar date are not literally remembered but rather are estimated, inferred, and 
guessed at. Without further evidence external to memory it is not possible to judge the 
accuracy of the plaintiffs recall of overtime worked but what we can be sure of is that 
these are estimates that at best would approximate to what actually occurred. The 
judge found scientific evidence in this case to be useful. 
 
Closing Comments 
Being a memory expert witness is truly fascinating experience. Learning what 
courts and other organizations need in the way of expert advice or finding out what is 
not helpful, open one’s eyes to what we have achieved in memory research and what 
is yet to be achieved – rather a lot, if my experience of being a memory expert is any 
yardstick. One conclusion I have come to is that outside the small world of memory 
research, understanding of memory is completely based on beliefs about memory; 
sometimes those beliefs approximate to scientific understandings, sometimes they are 
contradicted by the findings, and sometimes there is no credible evidence supporting 
them one way or another. Often as a memory expert one is simply indicating to non-
experts which beliefs fall in which of these three classifications. 
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One other, perhaps more scientific, aspect of being a memory expert witness is 
that one encounters data and patterns of data one would never encounter in the 
laboratory or even in field work. For instance, I have now acted as a memory expert 
witness in many cases of historic sexual abuse, over a 10-year period, and I have 
noticed an emerging pattern: cases come in two forms. One form is unique and 
unusual and other is more prevalent and of a type. I estimate that about 70% of the 
cases I have acted in approximate very closely to that of the case of B described 
earlier. This could, of course, just be a sampling bias, after all I have no control over 
the cases that come my way. Nevertheless, a question it raises for me is that, what if it 
does not arise from sampling bias? What if there really are two types of sexual abuse 
allegation? What might that mean for the majority of allegations of childhood sexual 
abuse, those that are like B’s? Which brings me to my final conclusion and that is: 
when memory is the only evidence the advice of a memory expert is essential.  
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